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At the Margins? Discourse Analysis and Qualitative Research

Julianne Cheek

Discourse analysis is a qualitative research approach that offers the potential to challenge our thinking about aspects of the reality of health and health care practice. In this article, the author explores one approach to discourse analysis and examines how it offers possibilities for different ways of viewing health and health care practices. She concludes by raising questions as to whether discourse analysis is at the margins of qualitative research, whether that matters, and where discourse analysis might take those margins.

Keywords: *Discourse; discourse analysis; qualitative research; Foucauldian theory; scholarship*

Discourse analysis has gained increasing prominence in qualitative research in the past decade. Studies drawing on this approach have focused on diverse substantive areas ranging from urban and business studies (Stenson & Watt, 1999; Wright, 2002; Yakhlef, 2002) to health-related areas such as nursing and midwifery (Adams, 1998; Hallett, Austin, Caress, & Luker, 2000). More prominence, however, has not necessarily led to better understandings and/or use of discourse analysis as a research approach in qualitative research. If anything, the waters have become muddier rather than clearer. Such muddiness results primarily from two things.

The first is the confusion (and that is not too strong a word) that exists around what, exactly, discourse analysis is. Not surprisingly, this involves uncertainty around what the word *discourse* means as well. Of course, such confusion and uncertainty is not unique to discourse analysis. For example, LeVasseur (2003) noted the same confusion pertaining to phenomenology in a recent article in this journal. Consequently, I begin this article by taking a closer look at both discourse and discourse analysis in an attempt to unravel some of the confusion that has enveloped, and at times masked, the potential contribution discourse analysis can make to qualitative research. However, I want to emphasize that I do not intend to

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replace confusion with certainty. I am a great believer that once we become certain about anything in qualitative research, we are probably in danger of oversimplification and creating orthodoxy. This is not to suggest that “anything goes” in relation to discourse analysis. Rather, what it is to suggest is that to understand discourse analysis, one must first appreciate the complex nature of both discourse and discourse analysis. This is a key point that I will highlight in various parts of this article.

The second contributing factor to a muddying of the waters is poor reporting of research purporting to use discourse analysis. Among other things, such reporting is poor because it tells us little of the underpinnings of the research, including the way that discourse analysis is understood and operationalized in the study in question. Often legitimate critiques of poor scholarship, for that is what such reports are an example of, become synonymous with critiques of discourse analysis itself, leading to a questioning of the use and value of such a seemingly fraught approach. What is lost sight of is that it is the scholarship that is at fault here, not necessarily the approach. To quote van Dijk (1997),

An analysis of discourse is a scholarly analysis only when it is based on more or less explicit concerns, methods or theories. Merely making “common sense” comments on a piece of text or talk will seldom suffice in such a case. Indeed, the whole point should be to provide insights into structure, strategies or other properties of discourse that could not readily be given by naïve recipients. (p. 1)

I will return to this idea later, when I explore how we might go about developing understandings about what sound reporting, and good scholarship, might mean with respect to discourse analysis.

DISCOURSE

There are diverse and numerous definitions of discourse, and yet frequently it is a term that is not defined but simply assumed. As Mills (1997) notes, discourse has become

common currency in a variety of disciplines . . . so much so that it is frequently left undefined, as if its usage were simply common knowledge . . . It has perhaps the widest range of possible significations of any term in literary and cultural theory, and yet is often the term within theoretical texts which is least defined. (p. 1)

The diversity of definitions of discourse can be seen in the following selection of definitions.

The term discourse refers in this context actually to occurring instances of communication, such as a novel, a newspaper article, a classroom interaction or a conversation between friends. These instances form linguistic units which generally exceed the limits of a single sentence. The discursive analysis of these units may help to highlight by means of various methods, the structural features and relations which characterize these linguistic constructions. (Thompson, 1988, p. 368)

A good working definition of a discourse should be that it is a system of statements which constructs an object. (Parker, 1992, p. 5)

A group of ideas or patterned way of thinking which can both be identified in textual and verbal communications and located in wider social structures. (Lupton, 1992, p. 145)

Even using just three examples, and there are many more, we can see the complex nature of discourse and the diversity in definitions afforded to discourse. Not surprisingly, the definition of discourse in use at any particular time reflects its theoretical underpinning. For example, simplifying to the extreme, the first definition has a linguistic orientation, the second is poststructural, and the third draws on social theory. This reflects where the authors of the definitions are situated theoretically and the body of knowledge that informs their work.

Therefore, it is important to clarify, for the purposes of this article, what I mean when I use the terms *discourse* and *discourse analysis*. It is within these parameters that the discussion will proceed. In so doing, like others before me, I am conscious that I am excluding other understandings of discourse and discourse analysis. Naturally, I have also been guided by my subjective judgments as to what is most productive and interesting to consider. The orientation I take, like any other researcher, reflects my own work, theoretical expertise, and strengths. Others will look at the field differently. What we are about to embark on is an exploration of *one possibility* for understanding discourse and discourse analysis from which we can distill some principles—not rigid rules relating to any one research design or a fixed method, but principles of scholarship, which can underpin any form of discourse analysis in use.

TOWARD UNDERSTANDINGS OF DISCOURSE INFORMED BY FOUCAULDIAN THEORY

This article is heavily influenced by the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault and postmodern thought. I draw on these theoretical frames to propose my working understanding of discourse. For Foucault, *discourse* refers to ways of thinking and speaking about aspects of reality:

A discourse provides a set of possible statements about a given area, and organizes and gives structure to the manner in which a particular topic, object, process is to be talked about. (Kress, 1985, p. 7)

Thus, a discourse consists of a set of common assumptions that sometimes, indeed often, may be so taken for granted as to be invisible or assumed.

Discourses are the scaffolds of discursive frameworks, which order reality in a certain way. They both enable and constrain the production of knowledge, in that they allow for certain ways of thinking about reality while excluding others. In this way, they determine who can speak, when, and with what authority; and, conversely, who cannot (Ball, 1990). In analyzing the effect of such discursive frames from a Foucauldian perspective, the researcher might ask, What rules permit certain statements to be made; what rules order these statements; what rules permit us to identify some statements as true and some false; and what rules allow for the construction of a map, model, or classificatory system (Philp, 1985)?

It is important to recognize that at any point in time, there are a number of possible discursive frames for thinking, writing, and speaking about aspects of reality. However, not all discourses are afforded equal presence or, therefore, equal authority. At any time in history, certain discourses will operate in such a way as to marginalize or even exclude others. Which discursive frame is afforded presence is a consequence of the effect of power relations. Discourses “represent political interests and in consequence are constantly vying for status or power” (Weedon, 1987, p. 41). Indeed, Foucault (1984) declared, “Discourse is the power which is to be seized” (p. 110). In Foucault’s analysis, power is thus a productive concept; it is not simply repressive. It is the operation of webs of power that enables certain knowledge to be produced and “known.” Paradoxically, such power also constrains what it is possible to know in certain situations. Thus, for example, the human body, as object of scientific/medical scrutiny is both constructed by and, in turn, assists in the construction of scientific/medical discourse: “in short, the human body is both target and effect of medical practice” (Armstrong, 1983, p. 111).

As I stated previously, knowledge from within one discourse can be used to exclude knowledge from others. The fact that some discourses (for example, scientific/medical understandings of the body) gain prominence over others is the result of sociohistorical influences operating on them (Cheek & Rudge, 1994). They achieve “truth” status, where truth “is an effect of the rules of a discourse” (Cheek & Rudge, 1993, p. 275). In contemporary health care, the truth status of medical/scientific discursive frames has shaped dominant taken-for-granted understandings of what is appropriate and authoritative practice. The ability and, at times, the claimed right of certain groups of health professions rather than others to speak authoritatively about health and illness is premised on the authority of the scientific/medical discourse from which their expertise is both derived and, in turn, legitimated. As Turner (1987) puts it,

The power of the [medical] profession . . . depends, at least in part, on the ability to make claims successfully about the scientific value of their work and the way in which their professional knowledge is grounded in precise, accurate and reliable scientific knowledge. (p. 217)

This power also depends on the ability to exclude or marginalize other ways of thinking about health care and health care practice, often relegating these other knowledges to the realm of “alternative” health care practices rather than the mainframe of authoritative contemporary health care. If the potential constraining effect of a particular discursive frame’s dominance in the health arena is recognized, then it is possible for space to be opened up for other discourses or ways of thinking. This can add a multilayered, multidimensional perspective to the aspect of health care reality in question. It is not a case of attempting to replace one discourse with another, or of using one discourse to exclude others.

TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Like discourse, *discourse analysis* is used in different ways. This is because discourse analysis has a multidisciplinary inflection and originates from several areas. Like

other qualitative analytical approaches, discourse analysis is not a unified, unitary approach. Indeed, Potter and Wetherell (1987) suggest that “perhaps the only thing all commentators are agreed on in this area is that terminological confusions abound” (p. 6). They further note, “It is a field in which it is perfectly possible to have two books on discourse analysis with no overlap in content at all” (p. 6). Sometimes, articles, reports, and speakers implicitly assume that the reader will know where the author is coming from both theoretically and in terms of the understanding of discourse analysis in use. This can create problems for the reader if such understandings are not made clear.

TOWARD ONE UNDERSTANDING OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

When discourse analysis is grounded in poststructural and postmodern understandings of the world and reality (the theoretical perspectives on which I am drawing in this article), discourse analysis involves more than analyzing the content of texts for the ways in which they have been structured in terms of syntax, semantics, and so forth. Rather, discourse analysis is concerned with the way in which texts themselves have been constructed in terms of their social and historical “situatedness.” Traditional content analyses, as Sacks (1996) points out, “fail to account for the insistence with which certain stories or explanations are put forth, take hold and shape images of [whatever is focused on]” (p. 59). Thus, an important assumption that underpins discourse analysis as a form of inquiry informed by poststructural and postmodern understandings is that language cannot be considered to be transparent or value free. Even the language that we take to be the most “natural,” that is, the spoken word or talk, does not “have” universal meaning but is assigned particular meanings by both speakers and listeners according to the situation in which language is being used.

Romanyshyn (1989) has written extensively about painting as a mirror through which we can read the image that an age has of itself and the world. Drawing on the understandings of discourse in use in this article, we could put this another way: A painting is a text that is constructed discursively. Texts can be pictures, interview transcripts, poems, procedures, field notes; in fact, texts can be any representation of an aspect of reality. Texts convey particular aspects of reality in particular ways. The way in which a text represents aspects of reality—the “conventionalized practices” (Fairclough, 1993, p. 194) or, put another way, the assumptions that the text makes “in presuming that it will be understood” (Agger, 1991, p. 112), are of “as much interest as what the text actually describes” (Cheek 2000a, p. 40). Furthermore, texts not only represent and reflect a certain version of reality, they also play a part in the very construction and maintenance of that reality itself. There is a dynamic relationship between the text and the context in which the text is produced. Texts are both constitutive of and, in turn, constructed by their context.

Exploring paintings as text, Romanyshyn (1989) notes, “A Cezanne canvas radically differs from one by da Vinci, and that difference attests to the different worlds in which each has lived and to the different eyes with which each has perceived the world” (p. 32). Put another way, Romanyshyn explores the way in which paintings reflect dominant understandings of reality (i.e., discourses) at a particular time in

history, and the way in which those reflections work to maintain the “normality” and “naturalness” of such understandings. In particular, he explores the way in which the technique of linear perspective, by which we view the world as if we were focusing through the lens of a camera, attained “truth” status in painting with respect to the way in which reality is to be represented and viewed. Romanyshyn demonstrates, using a painting by Jan van Eyck entitled *Virgin and Child in Church*, that the image constructed by linear perspective is but one way of representing reality. In this painting, the Virgin is very large in size compared to the Church in which she stands. Her size represents her importance and is related to understandings of her value, rather than an attempt to convey “realistic,” or linear, perspective. As discussed elsewhere (Cheek 2000b),

to the twentieth century viewer’s eyes, so imbued with and used to the dominant frame of linear perspective with respect to representations of reality, the image of the Virgin seems “wrong.” For what else can the size of things be except what they are in relation to their spatial distance from a viewer? What is more natural than this “law” of perception, according to which the further something is from you the smaller it appears? (p. 3)

All of this is to challenge the notion of “natural,” or authentic, images of reality. At any one time, a number of images or textual representations of reality are possible rather than one “authentic” or “right” text. Thus, for example, the understandings of “appropriate” health care (health care being a text) that we have are at least in part produced by and, in turn, produce understandings about health, disease, and illness. Texts are thus both product of and, in turn, produce discursively based understandings of aspects of reality. Any text, including those representing aspects of health and health care practices, will only ever convey and produce a partial perspective of the reality being presented (Cheek, 2000a, 2000b; Strathern, 1991). The image of an object as represented in a text is formed according to the frame or focus determining what is to be seen in the first place. This challenges the notion that texts are neutral and value-free receptacles, or conveyors, of information. Texts are shaped discursively, in that discourses frame the assumptions that every text makes with respect to how it will be understood. These discourses can be religious, scientific, medical, or legal, to give but a few examples. Discourse analysis situates texts in their social, cultural, political, and historical context. Questions that may be asked include “Why was this said, and not that?” “Why these words?” and “Where do the connotations of the words fit with different ways of talking about the world?” (Parker, 1992, p. 4). Texts are thus interrogated to uncover the unspoken and unstated assumptions implicit within them that have shaped the very form of the text in the first place.

It is essential to appreciate that discourse analysis is an approach rather than a fixed method. As Potter and Wetherell (1987) have pointed out,

there is no *method* to discourse analysis in the way we traditionally think of an experimental method or content analysis method. What we have is a broad theoretical framework concerning the nature of discourse and its role in social life, along with suggestions about how discourse can best be studied. (p. 175, emphasis in original)

Discourse analysis uses “conventional” data collection techniques to generate texts able to be analyzed discursively from a particular understanding of discourse

analysis and driven by a certain theoretical frame. These texts could be interview transcripts, newspaper articles, observations, documents, or visual images. These would need to be justified in terms of why they were chosen, how they were collected, and so on. Although the methods for generating texts and the principles of analysis may differ according to the approach to discourse analysis that is adopted, it is not a case of anything goes. The premises on which the research being reported has drawn needs to be clearly articulated. Indeed, *all* approaches to discourse analysis should involve rigorous methods and principles of “systematic and explicit analysis” (van Dijk, 1997, p. 5).

ISSUES I HAVE CONFRONTED WHEN USING DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Drawing on the approach to discourse and discourse analysis that I have outlined in the preceding discussion, I will now discuss some of the issues I have had to confront. However, given the limited space available, what follows is an overview only. Some of these issues have been explored by Parker and Burman (1993) in more depth, in a discussion somewhat facetiously entitled “Thirty-Two Problems with Discourse Analysis”!

The first issue with which I have constantly had to grapple relates to the range and diversity of discourse analytic approaches. Because of such diversity, it is imperative that researchers articulate clearly the parameters of their approach to discourse analysis. In a similar vein, studies using discourse analysis can, and have been, critiqued for using the terms *discourse/text/narrative/theme/story* as if they are interchangeable. The meanings and uses of these terms need to be specified carefully to avoid confusion.

At a methodological level, I have found an ongoing tension in discourse analytic research between the text and the context in which that text is situated. The dilemma for me as researcher is deciding how far I should go beyond the actual text I am analyzing to arrive at a contextualized interpretation of what is being conveyed. Following on from this, discourse analytic research also gives great power to the analyst to impose meanings on another’s text. This critique relates to the position of the researcher, and it is important to take into consideration the point that “analysts are not only readers but also producers of discourse” (Parker & Burman, 1993, p. 159). In addition, the readers of the texts that have been analyzed are themselves often overlooked in many approaches to discourse analysis. I have had to bear in mind that readers of any text brings to the text certain understandings that they use when reading that text. This, of course, includes this journal article as a form of text!

Furthermore, I have had to ask myself constantly “what of” critiques of discourse analysis related to issues of validity and reliability? I have come to think that in many instances, perhaps these critiques are not so much about validity and reliability per se as they are about “scholarship.” This is to return to the opening point about scholarly work as being important no matter which research approach is employed—including discourse analysis. It is interesting that questions about discourse analysis’s reliability and validity inevitably arise. Why is this so? Perhaps, these questions about reliability and validity can be viewed as texts with their own

contexts and seen for what they are: discursive constructions drawing on certain understandings of research. In discourse analysis as discussed here, *text is the data*, and the approach is therefore not about exploring “the” content or meaning of the text. Rather, it is about explaining how certain things came to be said or done, and what has enabled and/or constrained what can be spoken or written in a particular context.

Furthermore, discourse analytic approaches often refer to partial or situated reality, and view texts as constructed by and, in turn, constructing understandings of reality rather than describing *a* or *the* reality. Discourse analysis can thus be perceived by some as not providing a sufficiently rigorous methodology in which the reader is satisfied that the analysis has produced the only possible reading. Yet I would suggest that discourse analytic approaches are not necessarily aiming to seek closure in terms of producing the only possible reading, and that to seek to do so may, in fact, be in conflict with the tenets of the approach employed.

Similarly, results of discourse analytic studies are often criticized for not being generalizable. However, generalizability itself can be viewed as a discursive construct that draws on particular understandings of what it means to generalize. Such understandings are largely constructed by discourses drawn from mathematics and science. It may be possible to look at generalizability in a different way. For example, as Talja (1999) points out, another possibility is that “the research results are not generalizable as descriptions of how things are, but as how a phenomenon can be seen or interpreted” (p. 472).

I have found that developing a form of decision trail is useful in addressing many of the issues I have had when using discourse analysis. Such a trail involves explicating what theoretical understandings of discourse and discourse analysis are in use, and articulating clearly the theoretical framework underpinning the analysis. It must also contain detail about which texts were analyzed, why they were chosen, and how they were generated. In other words, there must be a rationale given for the choice of texts, and it must stand up to scrutiny.

A key feature that needs to be foregrounded in such a decision trail is the congruence between the theoretical constructs underpinning the approach taken to discourse analysis and the analysis conducted. For example, when reporting on my research using discourse analysis informed by Foucauldian analyses, I talk of the discursive frames to emerge in terms of Foucauldian understandings of discourse and not something else. Although decisions made will vary from researcher to researcher, according to his or her particular view and understandings of discourse and discourse analysis, the need for explicit reporting of the decisions made in employing a particular approach to discourse analysis does not.

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: AT THE MARGINS?

At the outset of this article, I emphasized that I did not intend to replace confusion with certainty, as I am a great believer that once we become certain about anything in qualitative research, then we are probably in danger of oversimplification and creating orthodoxy. That said, I have noticed a trend to try to create certainty in some of the writing and thinking about qualitative research. This is the product, at least in part, of qualitative research’s becoming more mainstream, for example

being used in doctoral and funded work, where there is the requirement that the methodology be specified clearly. This in itself is not a problem and, if done wisely and well, can only enhance the scholarship of that research.

What does become a problem, though, is when the quest for certainty focuses on the way things *must* be done rather than *why* they were done. By this, I mean that the emphasis shifts from the scholarship and concepts underpinning the research being discussed to focus on what is viewed as the only way to operationalize a particular approach. The approach then becomes synonymous with a series of steps or a set recipe, where the emphasis is on following those steps, not the reasons for doing so. Discourse analysis will always be, because of its interdisciplinary origins, a multiperspective approach with different emphases and understandings in use depending on the position adopted by the researcher employing the approach. There cannot be “the” set of rules for discourse analysis. I have discussed one “form” of discourse analysis, but there are many others. If this plurality is not recognized, then the potential is there to create a form of academic imperialism with respect to how to do discourse analysis, in which there is only one “right” way to do it. Certainty replaces uncertainty and ossifies thinking about the research approach.

As reviewers of articles, editors of journals, students of qualitative research, and researchers, we have a collective responsibility to ensure that such ossification does not become pervasive. It can begin innocently enough—the need to demonstrate exactly how to do something, the desire for a series of steps, and before we know it, not using these exact steps, in terms of doing a particular type of research, is considered wrong or in some way lesser. As Ian Parker (1992) noted over a decade ago with respect to discourse analysis (although he could be talking about any qualitative research approach),

Discourse analysis is not, or should not be, a “method” to be wheeled on and applied to any and every topic. All of those inside and outside the existing Discourse Groups which focus on method are aware that they are taking the risk of making an analytic sensitivity to discourse become just another thoughtless empirical technique. (p. 122)

Ten years on, his words still sound a relevant caution to us. There is a danger that discourse analysis (i.e., *the* discourse analysis method) is treated as a value free technology—a theory free method and tool to do research. It becomes an “it.” Concomitant with this is the ever-present danger of “academic imperialism” (Parker & Burman, 1993). Such imperialism runs the risk that to be assimilated into mainstream empiricist research, “we would then find our work relayed among the repertoires of the discipline, rather than offering, as it should, critical readings of its texts” (p. 170).

Where does this leave us? Well, one place it does not leave us is in a situation where “anything goes” with respect to discourse analysis. What it does leave us with, however, is a potential paradox with respect to discourse analysis and the margins of qualitative research. Discourse analysis has the potential to extend and push those margins, but, paradoxically, it can only do so by remaining well away from the margins in terms of the tightness of its scholarship. On the other hand, it is important for discourse analysis to remain at the margins and resist any attempt to mainstream it as a technique or series of steps. Discourse analysis is an approach that influences the research and researcher at every point (cf. Hertz, 1996)—from the

questions asked to those ignored, from whom is studied to whom is ignored, from problem formation to analysis, representation and writing.

Discourse analysis offers a way of viewing the margins in qualitative research as texts ripe for analysis. Margins themselves are a product of and, in turn, produce understandings about what is mainstream in research at any point in time. In exploring where discourse analysis is positioned in relation to those margins, much can be revealed about the often taken for granted assumptions that underpin qualitative research, particularly with respect to what is considered as mainstream at any point in time and why that might be so. In enabling such an exploration and interrogation of qualitative research as text, discourse analysis offers us the possibility for a heightened reflexivity, one that can assist in ensuring that qualitative research, no matter what approach is being employed, is not reduced to just another thoughtless empirical technique.

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